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When we began developing this topic last winter and early spring, the global 
pandemic in which we still find ourselves deeply entrenched, a year later, was 
just emerging. For many in the United States, including our former President, the 
threat seemed distant, even hypothetical.1 Few imagined the devastating loss of 
life, health, economic security, home, family, companionship, and “normal” 
ways of life that we would come to experience over the next year.   
As we near the one-year anniversary of the first lockdown orders in the United 
States, three broad themes emerge from the COVID-19 landscape that inform the 
topic of this symposium on The Future of Global Health Governance. First, com-
parison of the public health infrastructure in the United States to other developed 
countries. Second, comparison of the social safety nets and other measures that 
the United States took to alleviate the effects of the virus to the rest of the world. 
Finally, the impacts of partisan polarization and distrust of government and sci-
ence on pandemic response and management. 
 
II. PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
As of this writing, the United States is ranked fourth in the world in rate of 
vaccinations per capita against the COVID-19 pandemic.2 U.S. healthcare con-
tinues, rather stubbornly, to hew a private-market approach to health care deliv-
ery, albeit with a heavy hand of government regulation to attempt to correct mar-
ket imperfections and address some of the most inhumane effects of allocating 
scare health care resources based on ability to pay rather than greatest need. The 
lack of universal healthcare in the United States could be one of the contributing 
reasons why its vaccination rates is not among the upper echelons of countries 
like the United Kingdom, Israel, or the United Arab Emirates.3 
 
 1 See Thomas Franck, Trump Says the Coronavirus is the Democrats’ ‘New H oax’, 
CNBC (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/trump-says-the-coronavirus-is-
the-democrats-new-hoax.html (“‘The Democrats are politicizing the coronavirus,’ he said 
from a campaign rally in North Charleston, South Carolina . . . . ‘This is their new hoax.’”). 
 2 See More than 199 Million Shots Given: Covid-19 Tracker, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2021, 
8:12 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/. 
 3 Annabelle Timsit, Three Countries Have Pulled Far Ahead of the Rest of the World in 
Distributing Covid-19 Vaccines, QUARTZ (Jan. 11, 2021), https://qz.com/1953007/the-coun-
tries-with-the-most-effective-covid-19-vaccine-rollouts/. 
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One of the advantages of a universal healthcare system is that centralization 
of information makes it easier to match supply and demand of the vaccine, re-
mediating some of the initial logistical hurdles with vaccine distribution.4 Addi-
tionally, countries with national health services already have public health infra-
structures in place to vaccinate their populations because of pre-existing, robust, 
government-operated vaccination programs. By contrast, the United States has 
to start from the ground up in building its vaccination clinics and developing the 
legal infrastructure necessary for administering vaccinations.5 This lack of coor-
dinated government distribution led to testing “mills,” scams for money and per-
sonal information, and a Wild West of vaccine distribution as individuals deemed 
eligible for the vaccination (eligibility itself a moving target), chased rumors and 
social media postings from grocery store pharmacies, to local health depart-
ments, to newly designated distribution centers, like a treasure hunt for gold.6 
Even if the United States’ vaccine rollout is comparable to or better than other 
advanced countries with a universal healthcare system, its lack of an equivalent 
system hindered response to COVID-19.7 Effective COVID-19 responses in-
clude prompt diagnoses and quick quarantining of infected individuals to halt the 
spread of the virus, but both of these measures are hindered by the disincentives 
associated with visiting a physician.8 For one, the potential for facing ruinous 
medical debt as a result of the United States’ lack of universal healthcare is in-
hibiting our most effective COVID-19 responses (besides getting the vaccine) as 
underinsured are less likely to seek out diagnoses.9 This is further underscored 
by U.S. health insurance being bound up with employment—as unemployment 
rates steadily creep up as a result of the pandemic and the measures taken against 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 Elizabeth Cohen, US Lags Behind Some Other Countries in Covid-19 Vaccinations, 
CNN HEALTH (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/30/health/us-uk-israel-covid-
vaccinations/index.html (“Tuesday, [Dr. Celine Grounder] told CNN’s Jim Sciutto that health 
care in the US is ‘very decentralized, very fragmented,’ compared to the National Health Ser-
vice in the UK, ‘where they have really one system that they can roll this out smoothly to. We 
have many, many different small systems in this country.’”). 
 6 Joseph Goldstein, Hospital Workers Start to ‘Turn Against Each Other’ to Get Vaccine,  
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/24/nyregion/nyc-hospital-
workers-covid-19-vaccine.html?fbclid=IwAR0N9ncqtK7SFKDfJ5VUTDs0tuxmU-
jwiYNX_3PcLDjShNpWHRXKEftYfW3A (“Health care workers said rumors were prolifer-
ating in WhatsApp groups and amid the banter of the operating room. Stories have begun to 
circulate of a plastic surgeon who managed to get vaccinated early, of doses being thrown out 
at one Manhattan hospital because of poor planning. On group chats, doctors debate how—
and whether—to try to get vaccinated ahead of schedule.”). 
 7 Alison P. Galvani et al., The Imperative for Universal Healthcare to Curtail the 
COVID-19 Outbreak in the USA, 23 ECLINICALMEDICINE 1 (2020). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
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it (such as lockdowns), the less likely an American is to seek help for COVID-
related symptoms due to their loss of insurance.10 
The lack of a national healthcare system also highlights the racial and eco-
nomic disparities prevalent in the United States and may help explain why 
COVID-19 is disproportionately impacting African-American communities. 
Rates of adequate health insurance coverage are lower among people of color 
meaning they have less access to preventative healthcare.11 Because of their lack 
of access to preventative care, people of color are more likely to suffer from 
comorbidities, thereby exacerbating the severity of clinical outcomes when they 
do contract COVID-19.12   
 
III. THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL SAFETY NETS AND COMPARATIVE 
RESPONSES GLOBALLY TO HEALTH AND WELFARE 
 
Leading public health scholar, Lawrence Gostin has observed: “As a society, 
we forego the possibility of bold public health governance by any given branch 
in exchange for constitutional checks and balances that prevent overreaching and 
assure political accountability.”13 Indeed, not only horizontal checks on power, 
across the three branches of government, but also vertical checks, as among fed-
eral, state, and local authorities, also challenge the United States’ response.  
These structural obstacles have been revealed sharply in the COVID-19 pan-
demic. 
 
A. How U.S. Federalism Impacts COVID-19 Response 
 
Characteristic of U.S. Health Care Law is a “turf war” between federal and 
state/local authority to regulate health care markets and provide public assistance 
for those deemed eligible. Much of the story of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act of 2010 has been a power struggle between “big” federal take-
over of health care and assertions of states’ rights to do things differently within 
their borders. In public health, in particular, state and local governments hold 
broad and well-developed authority to compel vaccination, quarantine, isolation, 
 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 82 (3rd ed. 2016). 
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social distancing, masking, and other critical interventions to control the spread 
of infectious disease.14 The federal government’s authority is more limited.15 
There are three reasons why this aspect of U.S. federalism makes responding 
to the COVID-19 pandemic and the related economic crisis challenging. First, 
the inability of states to engage in deficit spending forces them to rely on Con-
gress to make up for any budget shortfalls as a result of reduced tax revenue.16 
Second, the federal government’s heavy reliance on discretionary fiscal policy 
measures as opposed to automatic stabilizers makes it difficult to respond timely 
and proportionately to crises due to the decentralization of information inherent 
in our federalist structure of government.17 Finally, the automatic stabilizers that 
do exist, such as unemployment insurance, are less efficient because the hybrid 
federal/state nature of the programs result in varying requirements and adminis-
trative obstacles to those searching for aid.18 
In the United States, individual states generally are not capable of engaging in 
counter-cyclical spending because of constitutional, balanced budget require-
ments and statutory spending limits.19 States’ lack of ability to engage in deficit 
spending after the Great Recession hampered recovery because states began cut-
ting spending in order to meet balanced budget requirements.20 Since Congress 
does not face the same budget requirements or statutory spending limits, states 
 
 14  Mark A. Hall et al., The Legal Authority for States’ Stay-at-Home Orders, NEW 
ENGLAND J. MED. (July 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2019662 
(“States have always had broad emergency powers, and legislatures have carefully reevaluated 
these laws over the past 20 years after terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and epidemics, en-
suring that civil liberties protections are included. Though these statutes are being tested in 
new ways, they have proved durable enough to protect against abuses of power . . . .”). 
 15 The federal government can take additional actions to supplement state and local re-
sponses that are inadequate in order to prevent the spread of international and interstate dis-
eases, but this power is not often exercised. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Presidential Powers 
and Response to COVID-19, JAMA NETWORK (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2763423. 
 16 Phillip Rocco et al., Stuck in Neutral? Federalism, Policy Instruments, and Counter-
Cyclical Responses to COVID-19 in the United States, 39 POL’Y & SOC’Y 458, 460 (2020). 
 17 Id. at 461. 
 18 Id. at 466 (“Yet while automatic stabilizers do exist in the United States, their effective-
ness hinges on how fiscal and administrative responsibilities are divided between the federal 
and state governments, the capacity of state governments to administer these programs under 
crisis conditions, and the ability of both state and federal agencies to cooperate to offer relief 
from administrative burdens that depress the uptake of benefits.”). 
 19 Glenn Follette & Byron Lutz, Fiscal Policy in the United States: Automatic Stabilizers, 
Discretionary Fiscal Policy Actions, and the Economy 1–19 (Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Working Paper, 
Paper No. 2010-43, 2010) (asserting that federal policy actions in response to an economic 
crisis tend to be somewhat counter-cyclical; however, state responses appear to be somewhat 
pro-cyclical possibly because of the constitutional restrictions on budget balances). 
 20 See Ben S. Bernanke, Ben Bernanke: I Was Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Save the 
States., N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/opinion/ben-
bernanke-coronavirus-federal-aid.html. 
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have to rely on the federal government to provide them with additional resources 
in order to fund policies designed to counter the effects of an economic crisis or, 
more pointedly to this symposium topic, a pandemic.21 Therefore, Congress’s 
failure to agree on passing fiscal measures responsive to the crisis can result in 
states being forced to cut spending, which response could not only hurt recovery 
but also lead to unintended consequences down the line.22 To provide another 
example from the Great Recession, the failure to pass spending measures resulted 
in states cutting budgets of local and state public health departments, arguably 
leaving us in weaker positions to respond to the current pandemic than we would 
have been in before the recession.23 
Moreover, Congress’s overreliance on discretionary fiscal programs as op-
posed to automatic fiscal stabilizers accentuates the challenge of dealing with the 
COVID-19 economic crisis.24 When a government actively makes a change to 
the level of taxing or spending in which it engages, it is enacting a discretionary 
fiscal policy.25 On the other hand, automatic stabilizers are fiscal policies in 
which a change occurs without futher legislative action when some threshold 
requirement is realized. An example of an automatic stabilizer is an increase in 
unemployment insurance payouts triggered by a certain percentage national un-
employment rate.26 
Another challenges is that discretionary policies require information in order 
to be effective, but there is a great amount of informational uncertainty due to 
the highly decentralized nature of our federalist government.27 Furthermore, due 
to the lack of a formal venue for intergovernmental negotiation for state and local 
officials, governments and other private interest groups end up competing with 
 
 21 Rocco, supra note 16, at 458. 
 22 William A. Galston, Using Automatic Stabilization Programs to Fight Recessions and 
Speed Recoveries, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/using-
automatic-stabilization-programs-to-fight-recessions-and-speed-recoveries/. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Rocco, supra note 16, at 461. 
 25 Expansionary and Contractionary Fiscal Policy, LUMEN, https://courses.lumenlearn-
ing.com/wm-macroeconomics/chapter/expansionary-and-contractionary-fiscal-policy/ (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Rocco, supra note 16, at 461 (“Where discretionary programs are concerned, federalism 
accentuates the challenge of coherent, comprehensive decision-making in the midst of a crisis 
. . . the decentralized and uncertain character of fiscal information makes it difficult for Con-
gress to match policy to the scale of the crisis.”). For example, Congress had to pass the 
CARES Act without information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis who reported on the 
extent of employment loss in the last week of April. The CARES Act was passed nearly a 
whole month before the Bureau’s report and the particulars of the relief bill were deliberated 
upon even before that. States had access to this information earlier but its decentralization 
from members of Congress made it difficult for them to get to the information quickly and 
pass policies that were proportionate to the extent of the economic harm being caused by the 
virus. See id. 
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one another for relief during economic crises.28 In addition, failures by Congress 
to pass additional discretionary fiscal policies to help states fund counter-cyclical 
programs is certainly problematic.29 It took Congress until the end of December 
of 2020 to agree to additional funding for states to assist with vaccination ef-
forts.30 State and local health departments, in the meantime, were not able to 
prepare for the vaccine rollout plans by hiring the necessary staff or setting up 
vaccination centers despite requesting more funding for months, thereby, con-
tributing to delays in the vaccine rollout in the United States.31 
Economists argue that U.S. economic recovery policies would benefit from 
increasing the amount of automatic stabilizers due to their quicker response times 
compared to discretionary policies.32 Even the automatic stabilizer programs that 
do exist in the United States have some aspect that is discretionary.33 Additional 
unemployment insurance benefits, for example, typically are not extended with-
out some form of discretionary policy decision.34 Furthermore, administrative 
hurdles due to federal and state eligibility rules screen out individuals who could 
be in dire need of assistance. Finally, significant variations in administrative in-
frastructure that support automatic stabilizers across states may result in signifi-




 28 Id. at 472–73. 
 29 William A. Galston, Using Automatic Stabilization Programs to Fight Recessions and 
Speed Recoveries, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/using-
automatic-stabilization-programs-to-fight-recessions-and-speed-recoveries/ (“Federal trans-
fers to states and localities provide efficient and effective fiscal stimulus. But during the Great 
Recession, the national effort fell short. While states were still struggling, the 2009 stimulus 
bill expired in 2012 and nothing was done to replace it. Instead, concern about rising federal 
deficits and debt triggered restraints on discretionary spending that shifted federal policy to-
ward austerity while unemployment remained elevated. This exacerbated the slowdown at the 
state and local level.”). 
 30 Jake Horton, Covid-19: Was U.S. Vaccine Rollout a ‘Dismal Failure’ Under Trump?, 
BBC (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55721437 (last updated Jan. 
26, 2021). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Heather Boushey et al., Recession Ready: Fiscal Policies to Stabilize the American 
Economy, BROOKINGS (May 16, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/re-
cession-ready-fiscal-policies-to-stabilize-the-american-economy/ (“Using evidence-based au-
tomatic ‘triggers’ to alter the course of spending would be a more-effective way to deliver 
stimulus to the economy than waiting for policymakers to act.”). 
 33 Rocco, supra note 16, at 461. 
 34 Id. at 467 (“Finally, Tier 3 is constituted by emergency benefit extensions that Congress 
routinely passes during recessions.”). 
 35 Id. at 473. 
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B. What Has the United States Done Compared to Other Countries? 
 
Federally, the United States has offered support to those affected by the pan-
demic through two large pieces of legislation—namely, the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES Act) and the Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act—as well as smaller pieces of legislation such as the Coronavirus Pre-
paredness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, the Families First 
Coronavirus Response Act, and the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and 
Health Care Enhancement Act. The CARES Act provided two weeks of paid sick 
leave if an employee is sick with COVID-19 or is quarantining following orders 
from the authorities.36 Furthermore, the Act provided support to parents with 
children under age eighteen whose school or childcare facilities are closed.37 The 
government provided support up to a limit of $200 per day, capped at a total of 
$12,000.38 Additionally, the federal government extended resources through 
SNAP to provide food to households with low income.39 Unemployment insur-
ance payments were increased by $600 per week, as well as direct payments of 
$1200 for each adult and $500 for each child of all U.S. residents with gross 
incomes up to $75,000.40 $500 billion in financial assistance in the form of loans 
were given to large companies and governments.41 $380 billion in economic sup-
port was given to small businesses as part of the PPP.42 The Consolidated Ap-
propriations Act of 2021 was signed into law on December 27, 2020.43 Along 
with the omnibus spending bill for the 2021 federal fiscal year, a $900 billion 
 
 36 Families First Coronavirus Response Act: Employee Paid Leave Rights, U.S. DEP’T 
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pandemic/ffcra-employee-paid-leave (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2020). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 USDA Increases Monthly SNAP Benefits by 40%, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Apr. 22, 
2020), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2020/04/22/usda-increases-monthly-snap-
benefits-40. 
 40 Danielle Kurtzleben, What’s In It For You? $1,200 Checks, 13 Weeks Of Unemploy-
ment Payments And More, NPR (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/25/8215 
14231/whats-in-it-for-you-1-200-checks-13-weeks-of-unemployment-payments-and-more. 
 41 Here’s Everything the Federal Government Has Done to Respond to the Coronavirus 
so Far, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND., https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2021/01/heres-everything-
congress-has-done-to-respond-to-the-coronavirus-so-far (last updated Jan. 25, 2021). 
 42 John Fuller et al., Senate Approves $380 Billion Expansion of CARES Act Small Busi-
ness Loan Programs, JDSUPRA (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/senate-
approves-380-billion-expansion-16029/. 
 43  Key Provisions of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 for Businesses and Indi-
viduals, JDSUPRA (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/key-provisions-of-the-
consolidated-2031866/. 
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stimulus package was included in the bill.44 The package included $302 billion 
in additional funding through the PPP for small businesses, $164 billion in fund-
ing for direct $600 payments to individuals, $119 billion for increased unem-
ployment benefits, $82 billion in aid for schools, $78 billion in health-specific 
measures, and $123 billion for other measures like increased SNAP assistance, 
childcare assistance, and rental assistance.45 
As part of the Trump administration’s efforts to help Americans, the Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration was given $110 million 
in emergency grant funding to “strengthen access to treatments for substance use 
disorders and serious mental illnesses.”46 This funding is important given that 
the COVID-19 pandemic foreseeably might cause an increase in deaths of des-
pair, such as deaths from alcohol, drug misuse, and suicides, as well as an in-
crease in domestic abuse incidents.47 For example, states reported increases in 
domestic abuse incidents ranging from 21% to 35% as a result of isolation caused 
by social distancing guidelines, economic stressors, and increases in negative 
coping mechanisms such as reliance on alcohol or other drugs.48 
States around the country have been taking measures to halt evictions, freeze 
mortgage payments, freeze utility shut offs, and grant grace periods for rental 
payments.49 Inconsistencies among states in passing policies such as mask man-
dates or halting evictions further reflect how federalism and the lack of a uniform 
federal policy or guidelines have hurt the U.S. response to the pandemic.50 Paul 
Nolette, a chair of the political science department, argues that this “can 
 
 44 Ferran Arimon & Mark Heimendinger, The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021: 
Round 2 of the Paycheck Protection Program, JDSUPRA (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.jdsu-
pra.com/legalnews/the-consolidated-appropriations-act-38378/. 
 45 Here’s Everything the Federal Government Has Done to Respond to the Coronavirus 
so Far, supra note 41. 
 46 SAMHSA Moves Quickly to Begin Releasing $110 Million in Emergency Grant Funding 
to Provide Americans with Substance Use Treatment and Mental Health Services During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/04/20/samhsa-moves-quickly-begin-releasing-110-
million-emergency-grant-funding-provide-americans.html. 
 47 The COVID Pandemic Could Lead to 75,000 Additional Deaths from Alcohol and Drug 
Misuse and Suicide, WELL BEING TRUST, https://wellbeingtrust.org/areas-of-focus/policy-and-
advocacy/reports/projected-deaths-of-despair-during-covid-19/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). 
 48 Kim Usher et al., Family Violence and COVID‐19: Increased Vulnerability and Re-
duced Reduced Options for Support, 29 INT’L J. MENTAL NURSING 549, 549–50 (2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7264607/pdf/INM-9999-na.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2021). 
 49 Raifman J., Nocka K., Jones D., Bor J., Lipson S., Jay J., and Chan P. (2020). “COVID-
19 US state policy database.” Available at: www.tinyurl.com/statepolicies. 
 50 Gretchen Morgenson et al., The CDC Banned Evictions for Those Affected by Covid. 
Why are Tenants Being Thrown Out on the Street?, NBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2020, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/cdc-banned-evictions-those-affected-covid-why-
are-tenants-being-n1251439. 
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introduce unfairness, for sure, because if you’re a renter in New York versus a 
renter in Alabama, then shouldn’t you have the same basic rights?”51 Recently, 
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) passed a temporary 
halt in residential evictions to apply to any state that did not have the same or 
greater level of protection in the order.52 Despite the order, tenants were still 
being evicted.53 Courts have been inconsistent when enforcing the moratorium, 
amply revealing the patchwork of policies that result from the United States’ 
federalist structure.54 The moratorium was set to end on December 31, 2020, but 
was recently extended to January 31, 2021.55 
The United States has been taking measures to help Americans being affected 
by the pandemic, but there are still other policy measures that could be learned 
from other countries. Other countries are giving cash transfers like the United 
States’ one-time $1,200 direct payment, but for longer duration. Canada, for ex-
ample, had a cash transfer approach of $2,000 per month for four months.56 Spain 
developed a unique moratorium on rent payments for those in a vulnerable pop-
ulation for a period of time depending on the type of landlord.57 For instance, 
“there is a compulsory automatic moratorium on rent payments for vulnerable 
households for four months, with rental payments due over a three-year period, 
or a reduction of rent by 50% for four months” for tenants with more sophisti-
cated landlords such as companies or owners of ten or more properties.58 
Many countries are offering more generous pandemic employment insurance 
than the United States.59 Some governments are subsidizing or completely pay-
ing for employees that have to take leave for COVID-related reasons, including 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Pre-
vent the Further Spread of COVID–19, 85 FED. REG. 173 (2020), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09-04/pdf/2020-19654.pdf. 
 53 Morgenson, supra note 50. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Mary K. Cunningham & Abby Boshart, Extending the CDC Eviction Moratorium 
Would Keep Families Housed and Prevent the Spread of COVID-19, URBAN WIRE (Dec. 11, 
2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/extending-cdc-eviction-moratorium-would-keep-
families-housed-and-prevent-spread-covid-19. 
 56 Ugo Gentilini et al., Social Protection and Jobs Responses to COVID-19: A Real-Time 
Review of Country Measures, WORLDBANK 1, 108 (2020), http://documents1.world 
bank.org/curated/en/590531592231143435/pdf/Social-Protection-and-Jobs-Responses-to-
COVID-19-A-Real-Time-Review-of-Country-Measures-June-12-2020.pdf. 
 57 COVID-19-Employment-and-Social-Policy-Responses, OFF. ECON. DEV. (July 24, 
2020), http://www.oecd.org/social/Covid-19-Employment-and-Social-Policy-Responses-by-
Country.xlsx. 
 58 Id.; Policy Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis, OFF. ECON. DEV., 
https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/country-policy-tracker (follow “Employment and Social” 
hyperlink) (last updated Jul. 24, 2020). 
 59 Id. 
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having to take care of someone sick.60 Another approach by some governments 
is giving stipends to those recovering from COVID-19. Sweden provides a tem-
porary parental allowance compensating around 90% of a worker’s salary to 
cover the cost of a school or child care facility closure.61 Germany has modified 
the work week but allowed employees to retain 60% of their salary to reduce 
labor costs for companies and still maintain the labor force.62 Many of these 
measures that are providing benefits to the unemployed are being subsidized by 
the government or are completely paid for by the government.63 The Slovak Re-
public has prohibited employers from terminating employees who cannot work 
because of COVID-19 isolation or are tasked with caring for an individual with 
a COVID-19 diagnosis.64 
Other measures taken by governments to address challenges caused by the 
pandemic include healthcare-related spending. Saudi Arabia has shouldered the 
burden of coronavirus treatment and testing services by making them free.65 
South Korea is planning on subsidizing health insurance premiums for low-in-
come households.66 France has helped the homeless avoid COVID-19 by requi-
sitioning hotel rooms to provide them with temporary housing.67 Countries like 
Russia, Peru, Paraguay, and Nepal are delivering food to their most vulnerable 
populations.68 Grenada and Guatemala are providing food vouchers, medicine to 
fight COVID-19, and delivery of care packages of basic food items to affected 
vulnerable persons and households.69 
The United States’ fiscal policy response is as—or more—generous than the 
responses of other countries.70 Even so, given the previously discussed overreli-
ance on discretionary fiscal policy measures, the United States will struggle if it 
does not pass additional stimulus packages.71 Most European and other devel-
oped countries have stronger automatic stabilizer programs than the United 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Kurzarbeit: Germany’s Short-Time Work Benefit, INT’L MONETARY FUND: IMF NEWS 
(June 15, 2020), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/11/na061120-kurzarbeit-ger-
manys-short-time-work-benefit. 
 63 COVID-19-Employment-and-Social-Policy-Responses, supra note 57. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Gentilini, supra note 56, at 387. 
 66 Id. at 416. 
 67 COVID-19-Employment-and-Social-Policy-Responses, supra note 57. 
 68 Gentilini, supra note 56, at 317, 348, 351, 368. 
 69 Id. at 200, 203. 
 70 See Fred Imbert, How the U.S. Economic Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic Stacks 
up to the Rest of the World, CNBC (Sep. 28, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/28/how-
the-us-economic-response-to-the-coronavirus-pandemic-stacks-up-to-the-rest-of-the-
world.html. 
 71 Id.; see also, Vivien Lee & Louise Sheiner, What are Automatic Stabilizers?, 
BROOKINGS (July 2, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/07/02/what-are-
automatic-stabilizers/. 
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States, which allows them to respond quickly without separately navigating the 
challenges of legislative consensus on relief packages.72 In short, relief comes in 
the form of expanding already well-established systems rather than enacting 
novel responses to the pandemic.73 In addition, measures that other countries are 
taking, although they may seem less generous when looking at the absolute value 
of total dollars spent, might be more effective because they are tailored towards 
more permanent solutions. For example, policies that maintain the employer-em-
ployee relationship may have longer-lasting impact than the United States’ more 
impermanent approach of one-time stimulus payments or temporary increases to 
unemployment insurance.74 
 
IV. VACCINATION POLICY, VACCINE REFUSAL, AND GENERAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT ORDERS 
 
Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres passionately ar-
gued that “[t]he best response [to the pandemic] is one that responds proportion-
ately to immediate threats while protecting human rights and the rule of law” 
when confronted with the possibility that governments may use the pandemic as 
a pretense to adopt unrelated measures to strip individual rights.75 Countries must 
strike a careful balance between public health and individual rights to justify in-
trusions upon liberties that are inherently associated with measures designed to 
 
 72  Mathias Dolls et al., Automatic Stabilizers and Economic Crisis: US vs. Europe, 96 J. 
PUB. ECON. 279 (2012) (“We find that automatic stabilizers absorb 38% of a proportional in-
come shock in the EU, compared to 32% in the US. In the case of an unemployment shock 
47% of the shock is absorbed in the EU, compared to 34% in the US.”). 
 73 Stephen Snyder, How the US Coronavirus Stimulus Package Compares to Those of 
Europe, WORLD (Apr. 03, 2020, 1:00PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-04-03/how-us-
coronavirus-stimulus-package-compares-those-europe (“Yeah. So a friend of mine in France 
has a nanny, and she can’t work now because of this. And she got a letter from the government 
saying if she can’t work, continue to pay her and we’ll reimburse you. That is something that 
would have happened in normal circumstances if, say, the nanny, you know, got pregnant and 
had a child and got parental leave. And that same system is just taken and seamlessly ex-
panded to these circumstances in a way that’s completely different from what we have here.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 74 Jeremie Cohen-Setton and Jean Pisani-Ferry, When More Delivers Less: Comparing 
the US and French COVID-19 Crisis Responses, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (June 
2020), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/pb20-9.pdf. 
 75 António Guterres, We are all in this Together: Human Rights and COVID-19 Response 
and Recovery, U.N. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-
team/we-are-all-together-human-rights-and-covid-19-response-and. 
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mitigate the pandemic.76 Even still, deprivations of individual rights are not met 
without challenges.77 
As we see in the United States, public perceptions of COVID-19 and general 
compliance with government mandates often align with partisan and political 
ideologies.78 This leads to an individual obeying whatever rhetoric fits best with 
her own political leaning rather than listening to experts or science on the virus.79 
Studies suggest that Republicans are less likely to comply with social distancing 
guidelines than their Democratic counterparts, signifying the practical conse-
quences of partisan polarization of virus response in the United States.80 In addi-
tion to partisan polarization, another explanator of noncompliance with govern-
ment measures is the lack of social policies that would help ensure compliance.81 
In other words, people would be more willing to comply with lockdown orders 
for longer durations if there were existing safety nets, such as additional unem-
ployment insurance during this period, that would help them get through the or-
der.82 
As noted above, the United States has declined universal health care and con-
tinues to allow the private market to drive health care delivery for all but certain 
select segments of the population. Those deemed deserving of government as-
sistance due to age, retirement, poverty, pregnancy, dependency, veteran status, 
or a few other conditions may receive assistance through government health care 
programs. But even within U.S. public programs it is not accurate to suggest that 
 
 76 Lawrence O. Gostin, et al., Presidential Powers and Response to COVID-19, 323 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1, 2 (2020) (recommending that governments adhere to six key principles 
when responding to a public health crisis that implicates intrusion into individual rights: “(1) 
interventions should be evidence-based and grounded in scientific knowledge, not political 
considerations; (2) health officials should make individualized risk assessments demonstrating 
a significant risk to the public; (3) coercive measures should be proportionate to the threat 
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impartial hearings; and (6) government should ensure fair and equal treatment, avoiding 
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 77 See, e.g., 6th St. Bus. Partners LLC v. Abbott, No. 1:20-CV-706-RP, 2020 WL 
4274589, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 24, 2020) (alleging that the Texas Governor’s executive order 
requiring bars to operate at 50% capacity was unconstitutional under procedural due process, 
substantive due process, and takings claims). 
 78 See P. Sol Hart et al., Politicization and Polarization in COVID-19 News Coverage, 42 
SCI. COMM. 679 (2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1075547020950735 
(showing how politicized news coverage affects public perception of both COVID-19 and 
governments’ actions to counter it). 
 79 Christina Pazzanese, Why Isn’t the Right More Afraid of COVID-19?, HARV. GAZETTE 
(Oct. 30, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/10/what-caused-the-u-s-anti-sci-
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 80 Hart, supra note 78, at 3. 
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the government acts as a fiduciary, motivated solely by the best medical interest 
of its citizens. The U.S. modern administrative state was politicized in stark terms 
during the past year, with scientific evidence elided or ignored, agency leader-
ship dismissed for exercising independent judgment rather than upholding the 
party line.83 The lack of trust in the government risked the effectiveness of the 
COVID-19 vaccine rollout, with citizens questioning the validity of the scientific 
process by which these new products were brought to market.84 The phrase 
“modern administrative state” is not a neutral one but rather is used often in con-
servative U.S. political circles to refer to “big government” and usurpation of 
power under the federal executive branch, away from more directly politically 
accountable legislative representatives and state authorities. At a time where the 
spread of misinformation is arguably at its greatest due to the internet, it becomes 
even more evident how the challenge of general government mistrust is affecting 
an individual’s confidence in complying with government orders, and most dis-




Each of these themes has become even more critically important to examine, 
drawing lessons from the past and prescriptions for the future. This time last year, 
the pandemic was ravaging other parts of the world but had made minimal impact 
on U.S. shores. Now, it has become abundantly clear, both here and abroad, that 
the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel lies in the hopes that enough of the 
population takes the vaccine to develop herd immunity to the virus. The United 
 
 83 See generally Giuliana Viglione, Four Ways Trump has Meddled in Pandemic Sci-
ence—and Why it Matters, NATURE (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-
020-03035-4 (“At a campaign rally this week, Trump suggested that if he were re-elected, he 
would fire much-revered and long-standing infectious-disease expert Anthony Fauci, who has 
led the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, part of the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), since 1984. Fauci has earned international acclaim as an adviser on HIV/AIDS 
to six US presidents, and is one of the most-cited researchers in the world.”). 
 84 Zakiya Whatley & Titilayo Shodiya, Why So Many Americans Are Skeptical of a Coro-
navirus Vaccine, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti-
cle/why-so-many-americans-are-skeptical-of-a-coronavirus-vaccine/ (suggesting several con-
spiracy theories that are being circulated about vaccines ranging from the vaccine containing 
surveillance microchips to questioning the motives of the pharmaceutical industries). 
 85 Alexandre de Figueiredo et al., Mapping Global Trends in Vaccine Confidence and 
Investigating Barriers to Vaccine Uptake: A Large-scale Retrospective Temporal Modelling 
Study, 396 LANCET 898, 907 (2020) (“Sentiments seeding doubt and distrust and the viral 
spread of misinformation are contributing to a landscape of uncertainty. Some actors have 
purposefully polarised vaccine debates, exploiting the doubting public and system weaknesses 
for political purposes, while waning vaccine confidence in other settings might be influenced 
by a wider environment of distrust in government and scientific elites.”). 
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States can take notes from other countries on how a universal healthcare system 
can make the vaccine rollout more effective and ameliorate the suffering caused 
by the pandemic itself and the United States’ halting responses to the pandemic. 
Overreliance on discretionary fiscal policy measures creates a challenging envi-
ronment for states when mixed with a federalist structure of government. More-
over, public health interventions that call for collective action and compromise 
individual rights are challenging for a country like the United States, which con-
stitutionally enshrines values of individual liberty, freedom, and autonomy. That 
effort becomes all the more challenging due to widespread distrust in government 
and the spread of false information associated with attempts to address a public 
health concern. The hope is that the COVID-19 challenges faced in the United 
States provide lessons for the future, including a more robust public health infra-
structure; more sustained, widespread social safety nets; better coordination 
among various branches and levels of government; and appropriate reliance on 
scientific knowledge rather than purely partisan influences driving health poli-
cymaking.   
